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[So P. No. 17443. In Bank. A.ug. 5, 1947.]

LEO P ALMTAG, Respondent, V. CARL E. DANIELSON,
Appellant.
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:

Broken-Oom.peDB&tion-Sale by Employer-To Broter'. Outomer OIl Other Terms. - Ordinarily, the price at which a
broker is authorized to sell property is considered merely an'
asking price to guide the broker in his negotiations with
prospective purchasers, and if he procures a purchaser willing
to pay a lower price. the owner cannot deprive the broker
of his commission by conducting the final negotiations himself
and selling at a lower figure to the purchaser procured by the
broker.
Id.--Oompensation-Sale by Employer-To Broker. Ouatomer
· on Other Terms.-An owner is entitled to make a special con· tract with a broker whereby the latter is required to procure
'. purchaser willing to pay a particular price or meet apeei1le
conditions imposed by the owner; and where, in such eases,
· the owner sells the property to a purchaser procured by the
.. broker, but on terms different from those stated in the con"tract, the broker is not entitled to a commiaaion in the ab.·
, sence of bad faith.
lei. - Compensation-Bate and Amount-Commiaafons in Excess of Fixed Price. - In brokers' net contracts, a fixed net
amount must be paid to the owner and the broker's commission
is limited to the excess of the payment by the purchaser over
the net amount specified.
lel.- .oompensation--Oonstruction of Oontract.-ln an action
to recover a broker's commission on a written contract providing a sale price of $40,000 and a commission of 5 per cent
or a net of $38,000 to the owner, the trial court's interpretation
of the contract as a general contract merely stating an asking
·price, rather than as a special contract calling for a purehaser willing to pay a net minimum price, was supported by
evidence that the owner refused to pay the commiaaion on
the sole ground that he, and not the broker, was the proeuring cause of the sale: that in a telephone conversation and in

Broker's right to commission where owner sells property to
"11lS1rouler of broker at less than stipulated price, notes, 43 A..L.lL
; 128 A.L.B. 430. See, also, 4 Cal.Jur. 606; 8 Am.Jur. 1100.
• elL Dil. References: [1,2] Brokers, § 96; [3] B~kers, 1123;.
Brokers, 153.
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other communications with the broker prior to the sale, the
owner stressed the commission percentage rather than the
net figure; and that the only purchaser then in sight was one
who was willing to pay only $35,000.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Alameda County. A. J. Woolsey, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for a broker's commission. Judgment for plain.
tiff affirmed.
Nathan Frankel, Sloss & Turner, Sloss & Eliot and
Frank H. Sloss for Appellant.
Fitzllerald, Abbott &; Beardsley and Franklin C. Stark
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, a re& estate broker, brought
this action to recover a commission for the sale of defendant's
real property. Defendant sold the property to a buyer procured by plaintiff at a price lower than the figure at which
plaintiff was authorized to sell. The trial court entered
judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
The question presented on this apepal is whether the
agreement between the parties was a general contract merely
stating an asking price or a special contract calling for a
purchaser willing to pay a net minimum price.
In April, 1943, plaintiff wrote to defendant to procure an
agency to sell defendant's property. Defendant had previously attempted to sell this property personally and
through· brokers for a period of about four years. He replied to plaintiff's request by letter, dated April 29, 1943.
The significant passages of the letter are:
"1 acknowledge receipt of your letter under date of April
27 with reference to my property at 645 Watkins Street
in Hayward. Yes, I am interested in selling my property
in Hayward providing that 1 can get my price. I have had
quite a few inquiries as of late; however, I have not tied
up with anyone exclusively at this writing.
"The property, as you know, is one of the finest in
Hayward. [Here follows an exhaustive description of the
property.]
"The only reason that I would care to sell it is because I
do have an opportunity to put m:s mou.ey into another invest-
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ment that I would like to do. If it wasn't for this, I wouldn't
consider selling it at any price. I have a price of $40,000.00
on the property and if you should arrange the sale, I will
pay you 5% commission or a net to me of $38,000.00. [Here
follow details on taxes and frontage.]
: "If there is further information that you require, I would
be gl&d to furnish it to you. I am not overly anxious to seU
the property, but, however, as above stated, I would con·
sider a sale."
.' Upon receipt of this letter, plaintitf immediately reported
to defendant that he had discussed the property with a client.
The broker informed defendant that "I did not discuss price
.
the telephone, but I do think there should be only one
on the property, regardless of whether you sell it or we,
price being $40,000.00."
Pl .. ;,.. ~;ifl' made an active effort to sell defendant's property
"~, ...-.- and after May, 1943. His prospective purchasers
.~elLudEId one Elwood Johnson, the ultimate buyer. Johnson
a partner in an implement business and a competitor of
; tenants then occupying defendant's premises. He gave
broker little encouragement until September, 1943, when
company received a notice from its landlord terminating
tenancy. At this time Johnson requested additional
~.~[o1'Jnation concerning defendant's property, and plainti1f
i.OOlIlQlllcteQ him through the building and grounds. He in.,~Ded Johnson that a local bank was familiar with the
tJU'1DP8rty, and together they had a conference with the
:balnkell". who aftlrmedplaintirs views concerning the value
'iJ?ltain.titf nut showed Johnson defendant's letter of April
which stated defendant's terms and price. Johnson
willing to pay $40,000 and mentioned $35,000 as his
Johnson was considering other means of solving
··problem at this time, but plainti1f advised the purchase
flefendant's property and raised persuasive objections to
;JOJmsc)n's proposed alternatives. On October 4, 1943, Johnarrangements for a direct meeting in Sacramento
. defendant. He revealed his plans to plainti1f, who re!I1I8!1ted that defendant be informed of plainti1f's part in in[ _ _iDJr Johnson in the property. Plainti1f made certain
QeIena18.nt;'s knowing of his ,efforts by telephoning him.
" " ••,&4. . . . . is a con1lict in the testimony regarding the statements
during this telephone conversation. According to plain-
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tiff, he told defendant that he felt he had sold Johnson the
property and that Johnson was going to Sacramento to make
the purchase. He testified that defendant assured him of the
5 per cent commission if Johnson bought the property.
According to defendant's testimony. however. plaintiff
stated that he was unable to sell the property to John.o;on
and hoped that defendant could close the sale with him.
Plaintiff then asked if defendant would give him "something
for what efforts" he had put forth.
On October 5, 1943. Johnson and defendant met in Sacramento. They discussed the merits of the property, and defendant stated his price to be $40,000. Johnson !eplied that
the property was worth only $35,000 to him. Defendant offered the property for $38,000 and, when Johnson stood firm,
suggested that they split the difference and close the deal
at $36,500, subject to the approval of his wife. Johnson refused to commit himself on that figure, and the parties
agreed to resume negotiations the following week.
On October 8, 1943, three days after the Sacramento meeting, defendant sent a telegram to the broker terminating his
agency: ". . . my property . . . not for sale at this time
through any broker. Have decided to sell direct therefore no
commission to anyone." Shortly thereafter. defendant was
persuaded to give another broker a 10-day exclusive agency
to sell the property. Defendant meanwhile promised Johnson
that a definite answer on the $35,000 offer would be forthcoming in two weeks. The exclusive agency was not fruitful
and early in November Johnson purchased defendant's property for $35,000. Plaintiff demanded a commission, but defendant refused to pay it. This action ensued, and the trial
court, sitting without a jury, found that the contract was a
general contract and that plaintiff had procured a purchaser
ready, willing, and able to pay the sale price of $35,000. Plaintiff was therefore adjudged entitled to a 5 per cent commission on the sale.
Defendant appealed from thl) judgment on the ground that
as a matter of law the agreement between the parties was a
net contract, calling for a commission to plaintiff only if the
sale price exceeded the net figure of $38,000. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, takes the position that the agreement constituted
a general contract entitling him to a 5 per cent commission
on the sale price. Plaintiff also contends that even if the agreement was a net contraet, he is entitled to his commission be-
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. 'CaUse defendant terminated the agency and sold the property at a lower figure in bad faith. Since we construe the
agreement to be a general contract, it is unnecessary to consider plaintiff's contention regarding bad faith .
. [1] Ordinarily, the price at which a broker is authorized
sell property is considered merely an asking price to guide
broker in his negotiations with prospective purchasers.
Rest. Agency, § 447, Comment b.) If the broker procures
DU1'C1ILlLIiI::r willing to pay a lower price, the owner cannot
.HII.....,.;..",. the broker of his commission by conducting the final
!JJU~tia1~ioIlS himself and selling at a lower figure to the pur;".... ,.aA? procured by the broker. (See 128 A.L.R. 430; 43
1103.)
An owner is entitled, however, to make a special conWith the broker whereby the latter is required to proa purchaser willing to pay a particular price or meet
~.eei1IC conditions imposed by the owner. In such eases, if
sells the property to a purchaser procured by the
,~I'!;IJU:.(', but on different terms from those stated in the conbroker is not entitled to a commission in the absence
faith. (Backman v. Guadalupe R. Co., 78 Cal.App. 347,
[248 P. 296].) [3] In brokers' net contracts. a fixed
amount must be paid to the owner and the broker's com»8tlS&t:ion is limited to the excess of the payment by the purover the net amount specified. (Haigler v. Donnelly,
674. 678 [117 P.2d 331].)
the instant ease defendant does not contend that plain. was required to furnish a buyer willing to pay $40,000,
'priee stated in the contract, before he would be entitled
QOmmission. Nor does defendant regard this agreement as
contract that would entitle plaintiff to keep all in excesA
Instead, defendant conceives the agreement to be
.. net contract in which defendant must be assured
t,38;llOO net to him, but the broker is entitled only to a 5
ioIH>' ....,.,~ commission if the property is sold for $40,00 or more.
The contract, authough ambiguous, does not reasonitself to defendant's construction. Defendant stated :
a price of $40,000.00 on the property and if you
arrange the sale, 1 will pay you 5% commission or a
me of $38,000.00." If the phrase beginning "or a net
••. " is excluded, the letter clearly states nothing
than an asking price for the guidance of the broker.
'addition of "or a net to me of $38,000.00" is illustrative

)
522

)

..
j

)

[300.2d

of the amount that defendant would receive if the broker
sold the property at $40.000. The $38,000 figure has no
apparent independent significance, but is merely the amount
remaining after the commission is subtracted from the proposed sale price. Interpreted in this manner, the phrase may
be explained without doing violence to the remaining language in the contract.
If the contract were construed to require $38,000 net to
defendant. the provision for a 5 per cent commission would
have little meaning. In such a case, a sale price of between
$38.000 and $40.000 would result in less than a 5 per cent
commission to the broker. The requirement of a $38,000 net
minimum would also subordinate the proposed sale price of
$40,000. The $40,000 would no longer be the proposed sale
price, but would be transformed into a pivotal amount determining whether the broker should receive a 5 per cent
commission or less.
Defendant could have achieved the result he now seeks by
using clear language in the letter of April 29th. He failed
to do so and now attempts to construct a complicated schedule
of commissions purportedly based upon an agreement capable of a more direct and reasonable construction. (Oiv.
Oode, § 1654.)
Moreover, the trial court's interpretation of the contract
is supported by the evidence. (See Estate of Rule, 25 Oal.
2d 1, 11 [152 P.2d 1003. 155 A.L.R. 1319}.) There w&."
evidence from which the trial judge could infer that it was
not the meaning of the contract that a price of $38,000 net
to the owner was a condition precedent to the payment of
plaintiff's commission.
Before the commencement of this action defendant consistently took the position that plaintiff had not procured
a purchaser for the property. He regards himself and persons
in Johnson's home oftlce in San Francisco as the ones who
actually procured Johnson as the purchaser. Defendant introduced evidence at the trial to establish this point but the
trial court found that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the
sale. At no time, however. did defendant inform plaintifr
that he would be denied a commission for any reason other
than that he had not been able to sell the property.
Defendant's telephone conversation with plaintifr before
Johnson went to Sacramento and his subsequent communications with plaintiff are devoid of any reference to the so-called
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net price. According to plaintiff, defendant. stated over the
telephone that "if Mr. Danielson [defendant] sold the property to Mr. Johnson ... he would pay me a five per cent commission. ,. Defendant contends that even if he is assumed to
have made that statement, it is nevertheless consistent with his
present position, since he thought that Johnson was willing
. to pay the asking price of $40,000. Plaintiff's account of this
conversation, accepted by the trial court, as stre.'lRinlZ the
.. commission percentage rather than the net figure gains
strength, however. in the light of defendant's subsequent
· communications.
· On October 8th, defendant sent the telegram to plaintiff
· attempting to terminate the agency. There again no mention
· was made of the purported net minimum. Defendant merely
.
in the telegram that the property was no longer for
through any broker and that defendant had decided to
· sell direct in order to avoid the payment of commissions. Defendant was not obligated to pay a commission, according
'to his present theory, unless plaintiff procured a purchaser
.
to pay more than $38,000. The evidence establishes
that the only purchaser then in sight was Johnson, who was
willing to pay only $35,000, and defendant was then nego1:'iA.t.in,D with him for the sale of the property. If defendant
the agency because plaintiff had failed to proa purchaser willing to pay the net minimum figure,
could easily have so stated.
learning of the sale, plaintiff wrote to defendant
~uest:1IUl his 5 per cent commission. Defendant replied by
.letUn- and quoted his telegram of October 8th. adding: "The
~,,,,,..,.n"'1"N7 was listed at various times with several real estate
Jlrc)kei~~e firms, none of whom were able to move the prop• Therefore. no commission to anyone." Thus. even after
sale had been completed at a price lower than the now
lIfillMfll·t..,wt net figure. defendant was contending that he, not
was the procuring cause of the sale and for that
ref'ns~~ to pay the commission. Had defendant con1i~~pIated that the contract called for $38.000 net to him, it
IIJll~lOnablle to believe that he would have added that as a
R:IIn.un.d for refusing to pay the commission.
trial court could therefore reasonably conclude that
"'og.I''''''''''''Ul~'S actions were incoJl.'1istent with his contention that
understood the contract to mean that plaintiff was obligated
procure a purchaser willing to pay a minimum net sum.
judgment is a.ffirmed.

